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The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) out-
break in Vietnam was amplified by nosocomial spread with-
in hospital A, but no transmission was reported in hospital
B, the second of two designated SARS hospitals. Our study
documents lack of SARS-associated coronavirus transmis-
sion to hospital B workers, despite variable infection control
measures and the use of personal protective equipment. 
V
ietnam was one of the first countries affected by the
global severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
outbreak and on April 28, 2003, was the first country to be
removed from the World Health Organization (WHO) list
of SARS-affected countries. Sixty-one patients with labo-
ratory-confirmed SARS were hospitalized in two hospi-
tals, six of whom died; including the index case-patient.
All case-patients were epidemiologically-linked to the
index case-patient, and most outbreak amplification
occurred within one hospital. We investigated whether
nosocomial transmission occurred among healthcare
workers in the second hospital.
The Study
The SARS outbreak in Vietnam began with the admis-
sion of a traveler from Hong Kong on February 26, 2003,
to hospital A, a 56-bed, three-story, privately owned and
expatriate-operated facility located in Hanoi. Within
2 weeks, extensive nosocomial transmission of SARS
occurred in workers, patients, and visitors in hospital A.
On March 12, hospital A was closed to new admissions
except for sick hospital A workers. On that date, the 120-
bed, six-story public hospital B began admitting patients
with suspected and probable SARS. Hospital B treated 33
patients with laboratory-confirmed SARS between March
12 and May 2, 2003, the discharge date of the last patient
(Figure). Of these, 23 were admitted directly to hospital B,
and 10 were transferred from hospital A to hospital B on
March 28. Many of hospital B’s 33 patients were exposed
to SARS as patients or visitors in hospital A.
No nosocomial SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-
CoV) transmission was reported in hospital B, and none of
its 117 healthcare workers (defined as all staff working in
the hospital building during the SARS outbreak) became
ill with a SARS-compatible illness. This situation occurred
despite obvious challenges to infection control. When hos-
pital B began admitting patients, visitors were not tightly
restricted, the main elevator was out of service, and fami-
lies and workers often used the designated patient elevator.
Researchers (K.C.L., H.Q.N.) and infection control advi-
sors working daily on the hospital B wards reported vari-
able infection control and patient isolation, particularly
during the early weeks. On March 19, formal infection
control training was organized and substantial technical
support and supplies arrived from WHO, Médecins Sans
Frontières–Belgium, and the Japan International
Cooperation Agency. Systems were established to restrict
visitors, and entry guards and Médecins Sans Frontières’
advisors were tasked with distributing and monitoring per-
sonal protective equipment, such as N95 masks, gloves,
gowns, and hand sanitizer. Two of the authors of this arti-
cle (K.C.L., H.Q.N.), who worked daily on the wards
observed that infection control practices improved consid-
erably after these interventions.  
To help researchers determine whether SARS-CoV
transmission occurred among hospital B healthcare work-
ers, staff were offered serologic testing from May 12 to 14
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1Primary coauthor.and were asked to complete a short questionnaire in
Vietnamese. Participants provided written consent and
answered questions about demographics, level of contact
with SARS case-patients, and personal protective equip-
ment use during the busiest week of patient admissions
(March 12–19) and the remaining weeks of the outbreak.
Serum specimens were analyzed at the National Institute
for Hygiene and Epidemiology, Hanoi, and at the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, by indirect
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and indi-
rect immunofluorescence (IFA) on Vero E-6 cells infected
with SARS-CoV (1). Data were double-entered into Excel
and analyzed with SAS Version 8.0 (SAS, Inc., Cary, NC).
Of 117 hospital B healthcare workers, 108 participated
(92.3% response rate). According to the hospital director,
all 9 nonparticipants remained well, and none had a histo-
ry of SARS-like illness. Among participants, 62 (57.4%)
respondents worked on the SARS wards (Table). Most
(85.5%) were physicians and nurses. During the first week
of SARS patient care in hospital B, 39 (62.9%) of SARS
ward workers reported working in SARS-patient rooms for
>6 hours on their single busiest day. Of the 62 workers,
58.1% and 64.5% reported being in SARS patient rooms
during medication nebulizer treatment, and 65% reported
being in patient rooms during noninvasive positive pres-
sure ventilation. 
All 62 SARS ward workers reported wearing masks
during the outbreak. All but one respondent wore a mask
“always” or “usually” while in SARS patients’ rooms.
However, during the first week of SARS patient care in
hospital B, 43 ward workers (69.4%) reported wearing
only a cloth or surgical mask, often in combination. All 62
SARS ward workers reported using an N-95 mask after
March 19, although only 56 (90.3%) reported “always” or
“usually” using a mask while in SARS patients’ rooms.
Respondents reported using gloves 77.4% of the time
before March 19 and 75.8% after March 19.
Reported symptoms and personal health behaviors of
healthcare workers are also presented in the Table. One
SARS ward respondent reported a fever, and less than 23%
reported either a cough or sore throat. Extreme fatigue was
reported by 50% of the SARS ward workers. Antibodies to
SARS-CoV among our study participants were unde-
tectable by both laboratories. 
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Figure. Laboratory-confirmed cases of severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) by date of admission, in hospital A and hospital
B, Vietnam, February–April 2003. The ten case-patients who were
transferred from hospital A to hospital B on March 29, 2003, are
noted in gray.
Table. Occupations, SARS exposures, symptoms, and personal protective equipment use among workers on the SARS wards, 
hospital B, Vietnam, May 2003
a,b 
Occupation  SARS ward respondents N (%) 
Physicians  23 (37.1) 
Nurses  30 (48.4) 
Nonclinical staff (housekeepers, clerks, elevator operators, laboratory technicians, and guards)  9 (14.5) 
Ever in room while SARS patient getting nebulized medications   36 (58.1) 
Ever in room while SARS patient receiving noninvasive positive pressure ventilation  40 (64.5) 
During the first week of SARS patient care (March 12–19):    
On busiest day, worked >6 hours in SARS patient’s room  39 (62.9) 
Wore a mask in patient’s room “always” or “usually”   61 (98.4) 
Wore only cloth mask, surgical mask, or both  43 (69.4) 
Wore N-95 mask and other type of mask  19 (30.6) 
Wore gloves in patient room “always” or “usually”   48 (77.4) 
After first week of SARS patient care:     
Wore face mask in patient’s room “always” or “usually”  56 (90.3) 
Wore N95 mask  62 (100) 
Wore gloves in patient’s room “always” or “usually”  47 (75.8) 
Symptoms and personal health behaviors:   
Fever  1 (1.6) 
Cough    10 (16.1) 
Sore throat  16 (22.6) 
Extreme fatigue  31 (50) 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
bN = 62 Conclusions
This study has several limitations. First, our survey is
subject to recall and reporting bias, because not only was
it difficult for respondents to recall behaviors during spe-
cific periods within the previous 2 months, but respondents
may have been concerned that results could be used to
evaluate their performance. Estimates of SARS exposures
and the frequency of personal protective equipment use
among SARS ward workers are therefore probably inflat-
ed. Second, we collected serum specimens approximately
10 to 12 days after the last SARS patients were discharged;
although these patients were discharged after their 5th to
6th week of illness, the minimal chance that a patient shed
virus beyond the usual 2- to 3-week period (2) would the-
oretically mean that a few participants may have been test-
ed before seroconversion. A third limitation is our lack of
data on hand-washing or sanitizing practices, important
means of preventing respiratory virus droplet spread.  
The finding of no infection with SARS-CoV among
hospital B workers in the presence of 33 confirmed SARS
case-patients may support the hypothesis that, in the
absence of a superspreading patient or event, most SARS
patients will not transmit the virus (3–6). For example, in
Singapore, 81% of the first 205 reported probable case-
patients had no evidence of transmission of clinically iden-
tifiable SARS to other persons (3). Over 35 healthcare
workers in our study reported being exposed to a SARS
patient during events that can potentially generate aerosols
(i.e., nebulizer treatment or noninvasive positive pressure
ventilation), yet they did not acquire SARS. Although like-
ly many factors contributed, we demonstrated a lack of
SARS transmission both before and after the provision of
formal infection control training and personal protective
equipment. Contrasting the hospital B situation with that
of neighboring hospital A may be helpful; in hospital A,
extensive transmission clusters followed admission of the
index case-patient.
The 23 directly admitted hospital B patients were less
severely ill than the 38 hospital Apatients. In Vietnam, the
best available measure of relative disease severity is the
death rate and the maximal level of respiratory assistance
provided. Although no hospital B patients died or received
invasive mechanical ventilation; four received biphasic
intermittent positive airway pressure. Seven hospital A
case-patients were intubated; an additional two received
biphasic intermittent positive airway pressure. Five hospi-
tal A case-patients died in Vietnam, and the index case-
patient died in Hong Kong (7). 
Hospital A workers did not wear masks in the earliest
days after the index case-patient was admitted, although
shortly after the recognition of this nosocomial cluster,
enhanced infection control measures were initiated. In
contrast, by the time patients were going to hospital B for
evaluation, both patients and healthcare workers were
wearing masks (N.T. Van, pers. comm.)
Hospital Anursing staff likely also had longer and clos-
er contact with SARS patients. In nursing style, hospital B
resembled those of other public hospitals in Vietnam,
where nursing is traditionally a shared function with fami-
ly members. Families of SARS patients in hospital B were
observed by authors (K.C.L., N.Q.H.) to be feeding,
bathing, and toileting the patients. Hospital Anurses, how-
ever, were required by hospital guidelines to assume most
patient care functions traditionally shared with the
patient’s family (L.T. Hong, pers. comm.), thereby increas-
ing their direct contact with SARS patients and their respi-
ratory and other secretions. Furthermore, the more severe-
ly ill SARS patients of hospital A likely required more
intensive nursing care, perhaps increasing the duration and
dose of SARS-CoV exposure.
Environmental conditions at the two hospitals differed,
but the impact of these differences on SARS transmission
is unclear. Neither hospital had negative pressure rooms.
Hospital A was a more modern facility; however, hospital
B had designated SARS isolation wards and large spacious
rooms with high ceilings and ceiling fans and large win-
dows kept open for cross-ventilation. In contrast, hospital
A’s rooms were smaller, and individual air-conditioning
units were in use early during the outbreak. In addition,
hospital A had diverse patients (maternity, postoperative,
pediatric, etc.) housed on the same hospital floor when the
SARS outbreak began.
The findings of lack of transmission among hospital B
healthcare workers raises the question of whether family
caregivers or visitors might have become infected with
SARS-CoV, and about the relative infectiousness of hospi-
tal B patients in general. Although overt SARS transmis-
sion to visitors occurred in hospital A, no such transmission
to visitors was observed in hospital B. We lack adequate
data to quantify the exposure of visitors to patients at either
hospital, but the authors who were present (K.C.L.,
H.Q.N.) noted that after the first week, most hospital B
family members tended to always wear masks and to rarely
use gloves. Studies assessing the serologic status of family
and community contacts of case-patients are ongoing.
Although community transmission did not seem to play a
major role in the Vietnam SARS outbreak, at least two
episodes are known in which SARS transmission occurred
outside the hospital setting. One episode involved trans-
mission from a visitor to hospital A to five contacts. This
visitor was severely ill and was later hospitalized at hospi-
tal B on day 10 after symptom onset; he is known to have
transmitted infection to one contact in the 4 hours immedi-
ately before his admission. If SARS viral shedding peaks
on day 10 of illness and continues for 2–3 weeks (2), we
can assume that some of the hospital B patients were still
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directly admitted hospital B patients, the median days to
admission was 7 (range 1–13) after illness onset.
In conclusion, we found no evidence of SARS-CoV
transmission among hospital B workers, despite contact
with laboratory-confirmed SARS case-patients and
variable infection control practices and use of personal
protective equipment. This finding may be explained by
differences in infection control practices, use of personal
protective equipment (including masks for patients as well
as healthcare workers), nursing style, environmental fea-
tures, and clinical factors such as severity of illness and the
absence of a highly infectious SARS-CoV spreader. More
study is needed to determine how each of these factors
affects the risk of SARS transmission if we are to ade-
quately prepare for future SARS epidemics. 
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